Why mandate young borrowers to contribute to their retirement accounts?
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Publication:2061097
Recommendations
- LONGEVITY, RETIREMENT, AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION IN A RECURSIVE MODEL WITH AN APPLICATION TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT
- On financing retirement with an aging population
- Raising the mandatory retirement age and its effect on long-run income and pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pensions
- On myopia as rationale for social security
- Retirement saving with contribution payments and labor income as a benchmark for investments
Cites work
- A Model of the Consumption Response to Fiscal Stimulus Payments
- Efficiency and equilibrium when preferences are time-inconsistent
- Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting
- On myopia as rationale for social security
- Optimal consumption with time-inconsistent preferences
- Pensions, household saving, and welfare: A dynamic analysis of crowd out
- Rational overconfidence and social security: subjective beliefs, objective welfare
- Self-Control and the Theory of Consumption
- Social security and self control preferences
- Temptation and Self-Control
- Time inconsistency and retirement choice
- Time-Inconsistent Preferences and Social Security
- Time-inconsistent preferences and time-inconsistent policies
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