Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
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Cited in
(48)- A theory of intermediated investment with hyperbolic discounting investors
- Price discrimination with loss averse consumers
- Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment
- Modeling customer bounded rationality in operations management: a review and research opportunities
- Self-coordination in time inconsistent stochastic decision problems: a planner-doer game framework
- Cigarette taxes with endogenous addictiveness
- Optimal investment strategy under time-inconsistent preferences and high-water mark contract
- Consumer heterogeneity and surplus under two-part pricing
- Consumption and portfolio decisions with uncertain lifetimes
- Fishing for fools
- Life insurance and life settlement markets with overconfident policyholders
- When consumers do not make an active decision: dynamic default rules and their equilibrium effects
- Optimal harvesting of fish stocks under a time-varying discount rate
- Consumer exploitation and notice periods
- On incentives, temptation and self-control
- Temptation, horizontal differentiation and monopoly pricing
- Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency
- Performance of procrastinators: On the value of deadlines
- Finite horizon consumption and portfolio decisions with stochastic hyperbolic discounting
- Arbitrage opportunities in frictionless markets with sophisticated investors
- Present bias in the labor market -- when it pays to be naive
- Consumer loss aversion and scale-dependent psychological switching costs
- Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting
- Endogenous preferences and dynamic contract design
- Self-regulation through Goal Setting*
- Self-control and bargaining
- Designing pricing contracts for boundedly rational customers: does the framing of the fixed fee matter?
- Why firms' exploitation of consumer myopia May benefit myopic consumers
- Naïveté-based discrimination
- ESTIMATING DYNAMIC DISCRETE CHOICE MODELS WITH HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING, WITH AN APPLICATION TO MAMMOGRAPHY DECISIONS
- Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents
- The sunk-cost effect and optimal two-part pricing
- Commitment and partial naïveté: early withdrawal penalties on retirement accounts
- Misperception and cognition in markets
- Intertemporal price discrimination with time-inconsistent consumers
- Is attention produced optimally? Theory and evidence from experiments with bandwidth enhancements
- Time-inconsistent bargaining and cross-commitments
- Present-bias and the value of sophistication: splurging vs. smoothing
- Present bias amplifies the household balance-sheet channels of macroeconomic policy
- Present bias unconstrained: consumption, welfare, and the present-bias dilemma
- Present bias: understanding zero leverage policy and unstable capital structure
- Time preference and the welfare effects of tie-in sales
- Procrastination under partial naïveté: discontinuity and non-monotonicity
- Revenue management for strategic buyers with time-inconsistency
- Time inconsistency and second-order beliefs over types in extensive-form games
- Advance selling decisions with overconfident consumers
- Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?
- Nonlinear pricing with self-control preferences
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