Why firms' exploitation of consumer myopia May benefit myopic consumers

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.10.031MaRDI QIDQ356587zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Hans Zenger

Publication date 26 July 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.031

zbMATH Keywords

pricingadd-onsconsumer myopia

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Consumer behavior, demand theory (91B42)

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Cites work

• Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
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Cited in

(4)

• Does add-on presence always lead to lower baseline prices? Theory and evidence
• EXCESSIVE COMPETITION ON HEADLINE PRICES
• Informational benefits of managerial myopia
• Shrinkflation

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