Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents

DOI10.3982/ECTA17126MaRDI QIDQ5860028zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors

Publication date 18 November 2021

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17126

zbMATH Keywords

behavioral industrial organizationdynamic inconsistencypresent biasregulation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41)

Recommendations

• Contract Design and Self-Control: Theory and Evidence
• Present bias in the labor market -- when it pays to be naive
• Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
• Consumer exploitation and notice periods

Cited in

(14)

• Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
• The competitive and welfare effects of long-term contracts with network externalities and bounded rationality
• Consumer exploitation and notice periods
• The timing of contracting with externalities
• Present bias in the labor market -- when it pays to be naive
• Renegotiation and dynamic inconsistency: contracting with non-exponential discounting
• Naïveté-based discrimination
• Contracting with Diversely Naive Agents
• Corrigendum to: ``Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents
• Time-inconsistent bargaining and cross-commitments
• Time-inconsistent contract theory
• Present-bias and the value of sophistication: splurging vs. smoothing
• Present bias unconstrained: consumption, welfare, and the present-bias dilemma
• Contracting with a naïve time-inconsistent agent: to exploit or not to exploit?

This page was built for publication: Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5860028)