Equilibrium computation of the Hart and Mas-Colell bargaining model
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Publication:2637848
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Cited in
(3)- Bargaining and cooperation in strategic form games with suspended realizations of threats
- Existence theorems of generalized K-lateral support equilibria via local cooperative strategies for multi-player pure strategy games in tensor form
- Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model
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