Convergence of best-response dynamics in games with conflicting congestion effects
DOI10.1016/J.IPL.2014.07.012zbMATH Open1307.91024OpenAlexW1987025386MaRDI QIDQ477597FDOQ477597
Publication date: 9 December 2014
Published in: Information Processing Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ipl.2014.07.012
Recommendations
Applications of game theory (91A80) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Evolutionary games (91A22) Network design and communication in computer systems (68M10)
Cites Work
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- Algorithms, games, and the internet
- Congestion games with linearly independent paths: convergence time and price of anarchy
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game
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Cited In (7)
- Convergence Dynamics of Graphical Congestion Games
- Convergence to approximate Nash equilibria in congestion games
- Concurrent imitation dynamics in congestion games
- Capacitated network design games
- Convergence of Ordered Improvement Paths in Generalized Congestion Games
- The return function: a new computable perspective on Bayesian-Nash equilibria
- The speed of convergence in congestion games under best-response dynamics
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