Selfish routing in public services

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2013.04.003MaRDI QIDQ146294zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Vincent A. Knight, Paul R. Harper, Vincent A. Knight, Paul R. Harper

Publication date October 2013

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://orca.cf.ac.uk/48440/1/The%20impact%20of%20choice%20on%20public%20services.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryhealth careOR in health servicesqueueing theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Recommendations

• Inefficiency in stochastic queueing systems with strategic customers
• Self-interested routing in queueing networks
• Pricing, routing, and incentive compatibility in multiserver queues
• User equilibria for a parallel queueing system with state dependent routing
• Rational queueing

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1416627 (Why is no real title available?)
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• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
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• Worst-case equilibria
• Worst-case equilibria

Cited in

(12)

• Modeling strategic walk-in patients in appointment systems: equilibrium behavior and capacity allocation
• Decentralized beneficiary behavior in humanitarian supply chains: models, performance bounds, and coordination mechanisms
• A conservative index heuristic for routing problems with multiple heterogeneous service facilities
• Inefficiency in stochastic queueing systems with strategic customers
• The uniqueness property for networks with several origin-destination pairs
• Reconciling selfish routing with social good
• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
• Use of queue modelling in the analysis of elective patient treatment governed by a maximum waiting time policy
• A game theoretic model of the behavioural gaming that takes place at the EMS-ED interface
• Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement
• How bad is selfish routing?
• PoA

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• SageMath

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