Selfish routing in public services

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2013.04.003zbMATH Open1317.91016OpenAlexW2047410613MaRDI QIDQ146294FDOQ146294

Authors: Vincent A. Knight, Paul R. Harper, Vincent A. Knight, Paul R. Harper 

Publication date: October 2013

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/48440/1/The%20impact%20of%20choice%20on%20public%20services.pdf

Recommendations

• Inefficiency in stochastic queueing systems with strategic customers
• Self-interested routing in queueing networks
• Pricing, routing, and incentive compatibility in multiserver queues
• User equilibria for a parallel queueing system with state dependent routing
• Rational queueing

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryhealth careOR in health servicesqueueing theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Queues and service in operations research (90B22) Applications of game theory (91A80)

Cites Work

• A unified description of iterative algorithms for traffic equilibria
• A differential game approach to the dynamic mixed behavior traffic network equilibrium problem
• The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands.
• Bounding the inefficiency of equilibria in nonatomic congestion games
• Strategic behavior and social optimization in Markovian vacation queues: the case of heterogeneous customers
• Comparisons between observable and unobservable M/M/1 queues with respect to optimal customer behavior
• Equilibrium and optimal strategies to join a queue with partial information on service times
• The price of anarchy in an exponential multi-server
• The toll effect on price of anarchy when costs are nonlinear and asymmetric
• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
• A geometric approach to the price of anarchy in nonatomic congestion games
• A survey on networking games in telecommunications
• The Price of Anarchy in the Markovian Single Server Queue
• Worst-case equilibria
• Individual versus Social Optimization in the Allocation of Customers to Alternative Servers
• On Partial Equilibrium in a Queuing System with Two Servers
• Individual versus Social Optimization in Exponential Congestion Systems
• Optimal and equilibrium balking strategies in the single server Markovian queue with catastrophes
• Worst-case equilibria
• Computing network tolls with support constraints
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Regulation of Queue Size by Levying Tolls
• Customers' Optimal Joining Rules for the GI/M/s Queue
• Individual and Social Optimization in a Multiserver Queue with a General Cost-Benefit Structure
• Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology

Cited In (12)

• Modeling strategic walk-in patients in appointment systems: equilibrium behavior and capacity allocation
• The uniqueness property for networks with several origin-destination pairs
• A game theoretic model of the behavioural gaming that takes place at the EMS-ED interface
• Inefficiency in stochastic queueing systems with strategic customers
• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
• A conservative index heuristic for routing problems with multiple heterogeneous service facilities
• Decentralized beneficiary behavior in humanitarian supply chains: models, performance bounds, and coordination mechanisms
• Use of queue modelling in the analysis of elective patient treatment governed by a maximum waiting time policy
• How bad is selfish routing?
• Bayesian optimal knapsack procurement
• PoA
• Reconciling selfish routing with social good

Uses Software

• SageMath

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