Delegation equilibrium payoffs in integer-splitting games

DOI10.1051/RO/2013026MaRDI QIDQ2845032zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Sylvain Sorin, Cheng Wan

Publication date 22 August 2013

Published in RAIRO. Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1051/ro/2013026

zbMATH Keywords

basic integer-splitting gameconsistent chainsconsistent delegation equilibrium payoffsdelegation equilibrium payoffsdelegation game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Recommendations

• Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games
• Repeated delegation
• Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria
• Delegating decisions in strategic settings
• Delegation principle for multi-agency games under ex post equilibrium

Cited in

(6)

• Regular equilibria and negative welfare implications in delegation games
• On Delegation in Contests and the Survival of Payoff Maximizing Behavior
• Strategic decentralization in binary choice composite congestion games
• Preface: Special issue in honor of the 60th birthday of Sylvain Sorin
• Limit theorems for recursive delegation equilibria
• Contractual delay and efficiency in delegation games. Two-principal case

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