A selective tour through congestion games

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-24024-4_14MaRDI QIDQ3464474zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Dimitris Fotakis

Publication date 27 January 2016

Published in Algorithms, Probability, Networks, and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24024-4_14

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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Cites work

• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• A new model for selfish routing
• Algorithms for pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
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• Approximation and Online Algorithms
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• Braess's Paradox in large random graphs
• Characterizing the existence of potential functions in weighted congestion games
• Congestion games with linearly independent paths: convergence time and price of anarchy
• Cost-balancing tolls for atomic network congestion games
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• How much can taxes help selfish routing?
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• Taxes for linear atomic congestion games
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
• The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
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• The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
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• The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions
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• The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game
• Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing
• Worst-case equilibria
• Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung

Cited in

(6)

• Automata, Languages and Programming
• Transfer implementation in congestion games
• Leadership in singleton congestion games: what is hard and what is easy
• Congestion games revisited
• Experimental and Efficient Algorithms
• The inefficiency of Nash and subgame perfect equilibria for network routing

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