A selective tour through congestion games
From MaRDI portal
Publication:3464474
DOI10.1007/978-3-319-24024-4_14zbMATH Open1331.91009OpenAlexW1648128383MaRDI QIDQ3464474FDOQ3464474
Authors: Dimitris Fotakis
Publication date: 27 January 2016
Published in: Algorithms, Probability, Networks, and Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24024-4_14
Recommendations
Cites Work
- How much can taxes help selfish routing?
- Worst-case equilibria
- Selfish Routing in Capacitated Networks
- On the severity of Braess's paradox: designing networks for selfish users is hard
- A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
- Über ein Paradoxon aus der Verkehrsplanung
- Potential games
- The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
- The price of selfish routing
- Selfish unsplittable flows
- Approximate equilibria and ball fusion
- On the impact of combinatorial structure on congestion games
- The complexity of pure Nash equilibria
- The price of anarchy of finite congestion games
- Tight bounds for selfish and greedy load balancing
- Atomic congestion games: fast, myopic and concurrent
- Stackelberg Scheduling Strategies
- Stackelberg strategies for selfish routing in general multicommodity networks
- Network structure and strong equilibrium in route selection games.
- Approximation and Online Algorithms
- On the performance of approximate equilibria in congestion games
- Network topology and the efficiency of equilibrium
- Congestion games with linearly independent paths: convergence time and price of anarchy
- Approximating Nash equilibria and dense bipartite subgraphs via an approximate version of Carathéodory's theorem
- Stackelberg Routing in Arbitrary Networks
- The price of routing unsplittable flow
- On sparse approximations to randomized strategies and convex combinations
- Resolving Braess's paradox in random networks
- The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game
- The price of optimum in Stackelberg games on arbitrary single commodity networks and latency functions
- Efficient methods for selfish network design
- The price of anarchy is independent of the network topology
- Braess's Paradox in large random graphs
- The effectiveness of Stackelberg strategies and tolls for network congestion games
- Stackelberg strategies for atomic congestion games
- Nash equilibria in discrete routing games with convex latency functions
- Cost-balancing tolls for atomic network congestion games
- Algorithms for pure Nash equilibria in weighted congestion games
- Characterizing the existence of potential functions in weighted congestion games
- A new model for selfish routing
- The impact of social ignorance on weighted congestion games
- Exact price of anarchy for polynomial congestion games
- Taxes for linear atomic congestion games
- On the existence of optimal taxes for network congestion games with heterogeneous users
Cited In (6)
This page was built for publication: A selective tour through congestion games
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q3464474)