Common-Knowledge and Bayesian Equilibrium in Network Game

DOI10.14708/ma.v46i2.6346zbMath1463.91025OpenAlexW2908275772WikidataQ128668841 ScholiaQ128668841MaRDI QIDQ5135650

Takashi Matsuhisa

Publication date: 23 November 2020

Published in: Mathematica Applicanda (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.14708/ma.v46i2.6346

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumconjecturerational expectations equilibriuminformation partitioncommon-knowledgesocial costsBayesian routing gameexpected delay equilibriumexpected price of anarchy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games involving graphs (91A43) Traffic problems in operations research (90B20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

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• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Agreeing to disagree
• Selfish routing with incomplete information
• Non-cooperative games
• Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium
• Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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