Using reputation instead of tolls in repeated selfish routing with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_10zbMATH Open1319.91055OpenAlexW37361839MaRDI QIDQ2856136FDOQ2856136

Authors: Kun Hu, George Karakostas, Jingjing Huang 

Publication date: 23 October 2013

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_10

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games involving graphs (91A43)

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