Using reputation instead of tolls in repeated selfish routing with incomplete information

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_10MaRDI QIDQ2856136zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kun Hu, George Karakostas, Jingjing Huang

Publication date 23 October 2013

Published in Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-41392-6_10

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic network models in operations research (90B10) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games involving graphs (91A43) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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