Verifiable crowd computing: coping with bounded rationality

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-20796-9_5MaRDI QIDQ6166873zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Lu Dong, Miguel A. Mosteiro, Shikha Singh

Publication date 3 August 2023

Published in Frontiers of Algorithmic Wisdom (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20796-9_5

zbMATH Keywords

repeated gamesalgorithmic game theoryInternet computingcrowd computingmaster-worker computingverifiable computation outsourcing

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Internet topics (68M11) Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1617943 (Why is no real title available?)
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• Free-riding and free-labor in combinatorial agency
• Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games
• Mixed strategies in combinatorial agency
• RELIABLE INTERNET-BASED MASTER-WORKER COMPUTING IN THE PRESENCE OF MALICIOUS WORKERS
• Rational arguments: single round delegation with sublinear verification
• Rational proofs with multiple provers
• Rational sumchecks
• Robust Network Supercomputing with Malicious Processes
• Sabotage-tolerance mechanisms for volunteer computing systems
• The folk theorem for finitely repeated games with mixed strategies
• When selfish meets evil, Byzantine players in a virus inoculation game

Cited in

(7)

• On improved interval cover mechanisms for crowdsourcing markets
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5547975 (Why is no real title available?)
• Mathematical programming and machine learning for a task allocation game
• Costly verification in collective decisions
• Budget-feasible Sybil-proof mechanisms for crowdsensing
• Budget-feasible Sybil-proof mechanisms for crowdsensing
• Verifiable crowd computing: coping with bounded rationality

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