Budget-feasible Sybil-proof mechanisms for crowdsensing

DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2023.113978MaRDI QIDQ6168078

Wanyuan Wang, Helei Cui, Weiwei Wu, Xiumin Wang, Xiang Liu, Yuhang Xu

Publication date: 8 August 2023

Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

auctionmechanism designcrowdsensingbudget feasibilitySybil-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Theory of computing (68Qxx)

Cites Work

• The effect of false-name bids in combinatorial auctions: new fraud in internet auctions.
• reCAPTCHA: Human-Based Character Recognition via Web Security Measures
• Optimal Auction Design
• Unnamed Item

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