Quality of local equilibria in discrete exchange economies
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Publication:2178594
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.03.012zbMATH Open1434.91042arXiv1807.00304OpenAlexW3015323344MaRDI QIDQ2178594FDOQ2178594
Authors: Daniel Lehmann
Publication date: 11 May 2020
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Abstract: This paper defines the notion of a local equilibrium of quality , , in a discrete exchange economy: a partial allocation and item prices that guarantee certain stability properties parametrized by the numbers and . The quality measures the fit between the allocation and the prices: the larger and the closer the fit. For this notion provides a graceful degradation for the conditional equilibria of [10] which are exactly the local equilibria of quality . For the local equilibria of quality are {em more stable} than conditional equilibria. Any local equilibrium of quality provides, without any assumption on the type of the agents' valuations, an allocation whose value is at least the optimal fractional allocation. In any economy in which all agents' valuations are -submodular, i.e., exhibit complementarity bounded by , there is a local equilibrium of quality . In such an economy any greedy allocation provides a local equilibrium of quality . Walrasian equilibria are not amenable to such graceful degradation.
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00304
Recommendations
Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)
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