Quality of local equilibria in discrete exchange economies

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Publication:2178594

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2020.03.012zbMATH Open1434.91042arXiv1807.00304OpenAlexW3015323344MaRDI QIDQ2178594FDOQ2178594


Authors: Daniel Lehmann Edit this on Wikidata


Publication date: 11 May 2020

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Abstract: This paper defines the notion of a local equilibrium of quality (r,s), 0leqr,s, in a discrete exchange economy: a partial allocation and item prices that guarantee certain stability properties parametrized by the numbers r and s. The quality (r,s) measures the fit between the allocation and the prices: the larger r and s the closer the fit. For r,sleq1 this notion provides a graceful degradation for the conditional equilibria of [10] which are exactly the local equilibria of quality (1,1). For 1<r,s the local equilibria of quality (r,s) are {em more stable} than conditional equilibria. Any local equilibrium of quality (r,s) provides, without any assumption on the type of the agents' valuations, an allocation whose value is at least fracrs1+rs the optimal fractional allocation. In any economy in which all agents' valuations are a-submodular, i.e., exhibit complementarity bounded by a:geq:1, there is a local equilibrium of quality (frac1a,frac1a). In such an economy any greedy allocation provides a local equilibrium of quality (1,frac1a). Walrasian equilibria are not amenable to such graceful degradation.


Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.00304




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