Full implementation in backward induction

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.05.001zbMath1319.91067OpenAlexW409237521MaRDI QIDQ492868

Yi-Chun Chen, Yifei Sun

Publication date: 21 August 2015

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.05.001

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

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• Rationalizable implementation
• Exact implementation
• An extensive game as a guide for solving a normal game
• Virtual implementation in backwards induction
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• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations*
• A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Two-Person Nash Implementation

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