Fleet coordination in decentralized Humanitarian operations funded by earmarked donations
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Publication:3387948
Recommendations
- Decentralized beneficiary behavior in humanitarian supply chains: models, performance bounds, and coordination mechanisms
- The facts on the ground: evaluating humanitarian fleet management policies using simulation
- Impacts of earmarked private donations for disaster fundraising
- The transshipment fund mechanism: coordinating the decentralized multilocation transshipment problem
- The Humanitarian pickup and distribution problem
Cites work
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- A two-stage stochastic programming framework for transportation planning in disaster response
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- Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
- Covering-Location Models for Emergency Situations That Require Multiple Response Units
- Dimensioning Large Call Centers
- Emergency logistics planning in natural disasters
- Heavy-Traffic Limits for Queues with Many Exponential Servers
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Microeconomic theory
- Multi-objective evacuation routing in transportation networks
- Multiperiod integrated routing and scheduling of World Food Programme cargo planes in Angola
- Promised Lead-Time Contracts Under Asymmetric Information
- Recipient choice can address the efficiency-equity trade-off in kidney transplantation: a mechanism design model
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
- Staffing and routing in a two-tier call centre
- Stochastic Inventory Systems in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information: Cycle Stocks, Safety Stocks, and Consignment Stock
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- The post-disaster debris clearance problem under incomplete information
- Understanding the Efficiency of Multi-Server Service Systems
Cited in
(5)- Decentralized beneficiary behavior in humanitarian supply chains: models, performance bounds, and coordination mechanisms
- Modeling the impact of donor behavior on Humanitarian aid operations
- Service staffing with delay probabilities
- Vaccine supply chains in resource-limited settings: mitigating the impact of rainy season disruptions
- The facts on the ground: evaluating humanitarian fleet management policies using simulation
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