Fleet coordination in decentralized Humanitarian operations funded by earmarked donations

DOI10.1287/OPRE.2019.1941zbMATH Open1451.90080OpenAlexW3037952335MaRDI QIDQ3387948FDOQ3387948

Authors: Alfonso J. Pedraza-Martínez, Sameer Hasija, Luk N. Van Wassenhove 

Publication date: 8 January 2021

Published in: Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2019.1941

Recommendations

• Decentralized beneficiary behavior in humanitarian supply chains: models, performance bounds, and coordination mechanisms
• The facts on the ground: evaluating humanitarian fleet management policies using simulation
• Impacts of earmarked private donations for disaster fundraising
• The transshipment fund mechanism: coordinating the decentralized multilocation transshipment problem
• The Humanitarian pickup and distribution problem

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesdecentralizationfleet managementearmarkinghumanitarian operations management

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50)

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Cited In (5)

• Modeling the impact of donor behavior on Humanitarian aid operations
• Service staffing with delay probabilities
• The facts on the ground: evaluating humanitarian fleet management policies using simulation
• Decentralized beneficiary behavior in humanitarian supply chains: models, performance bounds, and coordination mechanisms
• Vaccine supply chains in resource-limited settings: mitigating the impact of rainy season disruptions

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