A lemons market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1582036
DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(99)00210-6zbMath0967.90008MaRDI QIDQ1582036
Publication date: 3 September 2001
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (7)
Optimal payment scheme when the supplier's quality level and cost are unknown ⋮ Employee-stock-options, production/service functions and game theory ⋮ Percentage rent contracts between co-stores ⋮ How to increase the impact of disaster relief: a study of transportation rates, framework agreements and product distribution ⋮ A game-theoretic approach to the freight transportation pricing problem in the presence of intermodal service providers in a competitive market ⋮ Pricing and ordering decisions in a retailer dominant channel involving a third-party logistics provider ⋮ Risk sharing and information revelation mechanism of a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain facing an integrated competitor
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- The Role of Inventory in Delivery-Time Competition
- Optimal Service Speeds in a Competitive Environment
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Competing in Product and Service: A Product Life-Cycle Model
This page was built for publication: A lemons market? An incentive scheme to induce truth-telling in third party logistics providers