Robustness against inefficient manipulation (Q2460084)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5211627
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| English | Robustness against inefficient manipulation |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5211627 |
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Robustness against inefficient manipulation (English)
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14 November 2007
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This paper evaluates possibilities of coalitional manipulation leading to the choice of Pareto-dominated alternatives. Under assumptions such as common knowledge of agents preferences, rational behavior and complete preferences orderings by each agent, it shows that absence of ties in the individual orderings precludes inefficient manipulations. A classification of tie-breaking rules from the point of view of their potential vulnerability to inefficient manipulation is developed. The dimension of the space under which it may occur is also investigated.
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voting rule
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scoring rule
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Condorcet rule
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coalitional manipulation
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expected utility
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0.82274556
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0.81992173
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