A Bayesian model of voting in juries (Q700076)
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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1809649
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| English | A Bayesian model of voting in juries |
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1809649 |
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A Bayesian model of voting in juries (English)
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30 September 2002
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Individual votes in group decisions are here modeled on a framework of inference on parameters determining the distribution of received signals. It is proven that, as the size of the jury increase, the probability of a mistaken judgment goes to zero unless unanimity is needed and the likelihood ratio is bounded. Conditions in terms of the ratio between hazard rates are also set.
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voting rules
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Condorce jury theorem
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responsive cutoff equilibrium
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0.8643194
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0.8494983
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0.8445327
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0.83354455
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