A game-theoretic formulation of joint implementation of environmental projects
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Publication:2566057
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2004.04.026zbMath1131.91370OpenAlexW1998829509MaRDI QIDQ2566057
Michèle Breton, Mehdi Zahaf, Georges Zaccour
Publication date: 22 September 2005
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2004.04.026
Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)
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