Value of cooperation in a differential game of pollution control
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Publication:2104301
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-09607-5_16zbMATH Open1504.91191OpenAlexW4285118642MaRDI QIDQ2104301FDOQ2104301
Authors: Yanyan Li 
Publication date: 7 December 2022
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09607-5_16
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Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Differential games and control (49N70) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23)
Cites Work
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- Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
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- The Shapley value as a sustainable cooperative solution in differential games of three players
- On a approach to the construction of characteristic function for cooperative differential games
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Cited In (6)
- A pollution control problem for the aluminum production in Eastern Siberia: differential game approach
- Time-consistent Shapley value allocation of pollution cost reduction
- On the Value of the Preexisting Knowledge in an Optimal Control of Pollution Emissions
- Cooperation in pollution control problems via evolutionary variational inequalities
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A DIFFERENTIAL GAME OF POLLUTION CONTROL WITH OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS
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