Credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies in linear-state differential games (Q852115)
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| Language | Label | Description | Also known as |
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| English | Credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies in linear-state differential games |
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Credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies in linear-state differential games (English)
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27 November 2006
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The credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies for the class of linear-state differential games is characterized. A general condition for credibility is obtained and its use is illustrated in two differential games taken from the literature on environmental economics and knowledge accumulation. It is shown that the proposed linear incentive strategies are not always credible. Alternative nonlinear credible strategies are provided.
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linear-state differential games
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cooperation
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incentive equilibria
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credibility
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environmental economics
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knowledge accumulation
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