Controlled predatory pricing in a multiperiod Stackelberg game: an MPEC approach
DOI10.1007/s10898-010-9585-xzbMath1231.91126OpenAlexW2149760726MaRDI QIDQ540710
Samir Elhedhli, Joe Naoum-Sawaya
Publication date: 3 June 2011
Published in: Journal of Global Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10898-010-9585-x
nonlinear optimizationoligopolyStackelbergmathematical programming with equilibrium constraintspredatory pricing
Mixed integer programming (90C11) Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Complementarity and equilibrium problems and variational inequalities (finite dimensions) (aspects of mathematical programming) (90C33) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (5)
Cites Work
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