The value of public information in a Cournot duopoly.

DOI10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00028-9zbMath1064.91038MaRDI QIDQ1408711

Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz, Ezra Einy

Publication date: 25 September 2003

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

game theory; market models; Cournot duopoly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A80: Applications of game theory

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

Related Items

On the Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games, The value of public information in common-value Tullock contests, When is the value of public information positive in a game?, On the existence of Bayesian Cournot equilibrium, Public information in Markov games, Majoritarian preference, Utilitarian welfare and public information in Cournot oligopoly, The role of information in contests

Cites Work

• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• The value of information in a simple duopoly model
• Dominant strategies, superior information, and winner's curse in second-price auctions
• Cournot oligopoly and the theory of supermodular games
• Information advantage in Cournot oligopoly
• On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium
• Information Sharing in Oligopoly
• Information Transmission--Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria
• Value of Information with Sequential Futures Markets
• The Strategic Role of Information on the Demand Function in an Oligopolistic Market
• The Value of Public Information in Monopoly
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