Experimental evidence on coverage choices and contract prices in the market for corporate insurance

DOI10.1007/S10683-006-9152-YMaRDI QIDQ2481220zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Gautam Goswami, Martin F. Grace, Michael J. Rebello

Publication date 9 April 2008

Published in Experimental Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9152-y

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionexperimental evidenceinsurance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• An evolutionary analysis of insurance markets with adverse selection.
• Adverse selection or advantageous selection? Risk and underwriting in China's health-insurance market
• Price caps and efficiency in markets with adverse selection
• Insurance loss coverage and demand elasticities
• On the positive correlation property in competitive insurance markets

Cites work

• A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
• Adjustment patterns and equilibrium selection in experimental signaling games
• An experimental analysis of Nash refinements in signaling games
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games

Cited in

(2)

• Firm's protection against disasters: are investment and insurance substitutes or complements?
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6800896 (Why is no real title available?)

This page was built for publication: Experimental evidence on coverage choices and contract prices in the market for corporate insurance

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2481220)