Signaling games with endogenous types

DOI10.1007/S00182-022-00813-4MaRDI QIDQ2689418zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors In-Koo Cho

Publication date 10 March 2023

Published in International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00813-4

zbMATH Keywords

endogenous typesequilibrium selectionexogenous typesmonotonic signaling gamessignaling gamessingle crossing propertystrategic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Labor markets (91B39)

Recommendations

• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
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• Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
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Cites work

• A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• Sequential Equilibria
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Signaling private choices
• Signalling to dispersed shareholders and corporate control
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games

Cited in

(2)

• Signaling private choices
• Actions and signals

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