Bargaining over incentive contracts
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Publication:414377
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2012.01.003zbMATH Open1237.91153OpenAlexW1995507538MaRDI QIDQ414377FDOQ414377
Authors: Zhiyong Yao 
Publication date: 11 May 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.01.003
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Cites Work
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
- Monopoly and product quality
- Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty
- Sequential bargaining under asymmetric information
- Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
- Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal
- Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Participation constraints in adverse selection models
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Alternating-offer bargaining over menus under incomplete information
- Strategic Delay in Bargaining
- Bargaining over a Menu of Wage Contracts
- Informational Equilibrium
- Contract design and bargaining power
Cited In (14)
- Contract renewal under uncertainty
- Bidding for incentive contracts
- Incentive Contracting Based Upon Consumer Indifference
- Contract adjustment under uncertainty
- Contract design and bargaining power
- Contract and game theory: basic concepts for settings with finite horizons
- Negotiating using rewards
- Bargaining power effects in financial contracting. A joint analysis of contract type and placement mode choices.
- Hold-up in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection
- Bargaining conventions
- Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty
- Immediate settlement or enduring a strike: the choice of signals
- Bargaining over a Menu of Wage Contracts
- Holdup and innovation
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