Bargaining over incentive contracts
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Publication:414377
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2012.01.003zbMath1237.91153OpenAlexW1995507538MaRDI QIDQ414377
Publication date: 11 May 2012
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2012.01.003
Related Items (3)
Risk aversion in the Nash bargaining problem with uncertainty ⋮ IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT OR ENDURING A STRIKE: THE CHOICE OF SIGNALS ⋮ Hold-up in vertical hierarchies with adverse selection
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