IMMEDIATE SETTLEMENT OR ENDURING A STRIKE: THE CHOICE OF SIGNALS

DOI10.1111/BOER.12007zbMath1329.91086OpenAlexW1536903525MaRDI QIDQ3466898

Zhiyong Yao

Publication date: 25 January 2016

Published in: Bulletin of Economic Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12007

zbMATH Keywords

signalingstrikestrategic delay

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Bargaining over incentive contracts
• Strategic stability and uniqueness in signaling games
• Repeated Bargaining with Persistent Private Information
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Delay in Bargaining
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model

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