How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects

DOI10.1016/J.EJOR.2018.11.056MaRDI QIDQ1713753zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors G. Bergantiños, Leticia Lorenzo

Publication date 28 January 2019

Published in European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/104574/1/MPRA_paper_104574.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

delaysgame theorypenaltiesPERT

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38)

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Cites work

• A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects
• Application of a technique for research and development program evaluation
• Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey.
• Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
• How to distribute costs associated with a delayed project
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3078997 (Why is no real title available?)
• Moral hazard, incentive contracts, and risk: evidence from procurement
• Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times
• Project games
• Serial Cost Sharing
• Time overruns as opportunistic behavior in public procurement
• Two approaches to the problem of sharing delay costs in joint projects

Cited in

(7)

• Sharing delay costs in stochastic scheduling problems with delays
• Incentive schemes for resolving Parkinson's law in project management
• Sequential bankruptcy problems
• Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones
• Time of the essence
• Time-related incentive contracts for managing projects with uncertain completion time
• Hart and Mas-Colell consistency in PERT problems

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