Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times
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Publication:2018940
DOI10.1007/s10951-014-0393-xzbMath1310.90051MaRDI QIDQ2018940
Cyril Briand, Jean-Charles Billaut, Alessandro Agnetis, Přemysl Šucha
Publication date: 26 March 2015
Published in: Journal of Scheduling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10951-014-0393-x
90B15: Stochastic network models in operations research
90B36: Stochastic scheduling theory in operations research
68M20: Performance evaluation, queueing, and scheduling in the context of computer systems
91B50: General equilibrium theory
Related Items
Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem, How to apply penalties to avoid delays in projects, Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones, Preface: Project management and scheduling, Price of anarchy and price of stability in multi-agent project scheduling
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