Price of anarchy and price of stability in multi-agent project scheduling

DOI10.1007/S10479-019-03235-WzbMATH Open1429.90021OpenAlexW2938099231WikidataQ128046796 ScholiaQ128046796MaRDI QIDQ2288992FDOQ2288992

Authors: Alessandro Agnetis, Cyril Briand, Sandra Ulrich Ngueveu, Přemysl Šůcha 

Publication date: 20 January 2020

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03235-w

Recommendations

• Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times
• Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones
• Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem
• Nash equilibria in competitive project scheduling
• The price of anarchy for utilitarian scheduling games on related machines

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaprice of anarchyprice of stabilityflow networksmulti-agent project scheduling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Cites Work

• Network flows. Theory, algorithms, and applications.
• A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects
• Characterization and Generation of a General Class of Resource-Constrained Project Scheduling Problems
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• Project scheduling. A research handbook.
• The multi-mode resource-constrained project scheduling problem with generalized precedence relations
• Rangen: A random network generator for activity-on-the-node networks
• Phase transitions in project scheduling
• Algorithms – ESA 2005
• A market-based multi-agent system model for decentralized multi-project scheduling
• Solving the Project Time/Cost Tradeoff Problem Using the Minimal Cut Concept
• Sequential and parallel algorithms for minimum flows.
• Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem
• Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times
• Nash equilibria in competitive project scheduling

Cited In (6)

• Magnitude of inefficiency
• Nash equilibria in competitive project scheduling
• Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem
• Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times
• Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones
• Title not available (Why is that?)

Uses Software

• RanGen

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