Price of anarchy and price of stability in multi-agent project scheduling

DOI10.1007/S10479-019-03235-WMaRDI QIDQ2288992zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Alessandro Agnetis, Cyril Briand, Sandra Ulrich Ngueveu, Přemysl Šůcha

Publication date 20 January 2020

Published in Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03235-w

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriaprice of anarchyprice of stabilityflow networksmulti-agent project scheduling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) Noncooperative games (91A10)

Recommendations

• Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times
• Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones
• Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem
• Nash equilibria in competitive project scheduling
• The price of anarchy for utilitarian scheduling games on related machines

Cites work

• A game theoretical approach to sharing penalties and rewards in projects
• A market-based multi-agent system model for decentralized multi-project scheduling
• Algorithms – ESA 2005
• Characterization and Generation of a General Class of Resource-Constrained Project Scheduling Problems
• Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem
• Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times
• Nash equilibria in competitive project scheduling
• Network flows. Theory, algorithms, and applications.
• Phase transitions in project scheduling
• Project scheduling. A research handbook.
• Rangen: A random network generator for activity-on-the-node networks
• Sequential and parallel algorithms for minimum flows.
• Solving the Project Time/Cost Tradeoff Problem Using the Minimal Cut Concept
• The Price of Stability for Network Design with Fair Cost Allocation
• The multi-mode resource-constrained project scheduling problem with generalized precedence relations

Cited in

(6)

• Finding an optimal Nash equilibrium to the multi-agent project scheduling problem
• Magnitude of inefficiency
• Nash equilibria for the multi-agent project scheduling problem with controllable processing times
• Nash equilibrium solutions in multi-agent project scheduling with milestones
• Nash equilibria in competitive project scheduling
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6906899 (Why is no real title available?)

Describes a project that uses

Uses Software

• RanGen

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