Compensation and Transfer Pricing in a Principal-Agent Model

DOI10.2307/2526931MaRDI QIDQ3200848zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors David Besanko, David S. Sibley

Publication date 1991

Published in International Economic Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.2307/2526931

zbMATH Keywords

private informationmoral hazardprincipal-agent modeltransfer pricescompensation mechanisms

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Recommendations

• Internal Pricing
• Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
• Transfer pricing in a dynamic marketing-operations interface
• Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information
• Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

Cited in

(4)

• Transfer Pricing—Heterogeneous Agents and Learning Effects
• Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
• Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information
• Negotiating transfer pricing using the Nash bargaining solution

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