Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information
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Publication:1278718
DOI10.1016/0377-2217(95)00096-8zbMath0922.90020OpenAlexW2058820009MaRDI QIDQ1278718
Shu-Hsing Li, Kashi R. Balachandran
Publication date: 22 February 1999
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://ntur.lib.ntu.edu.tw/bitstream/246246/236960/-1/02.pdf
moral hazardprivate informationinformation asymmetrytransfer pricedecentralized firmoptimal coordination mechanisms
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The newsvendor's optimal incentive contracts for multiple advertisers ⋮ Intrafirm trade, arm's-length transfer pricing rule, and coordination failure ⋮ An approximate solution to rent-seeking contests with private information
Cites Work
- Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
- Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
- Countervailing incentives in agency problems
- The Groves Scheme, Profit Sharing and Moral Hazard
- Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information
- Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Intrafirm Resource Allocation
- Project Evaluation and Control in Decentralized Firms: Is Capital Rationing Always Optimal?
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