The Groves Scheme, Profit Sharing and Moral Hazard

DOI10.1287/MNSC.30.1.20zbMATH Open0558.90004OpenAlexW2124820711MaRDI QIDQ3347567FDOQ3347567

Authors: Susan I. Cohen, Martin Loeb 

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.30.1.20

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zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumasymmetric informationmoral hazardincentive schemesprofit sharingdominant equilibriumGroves scheme

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

Cited In (2)

• Optimal transfer pricing schemes for work averse division managers with private information
• Title not available (Why is that?)

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