Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets

DOI10.1007/S10436-008-0104-8zbMATH Open1233.91107OpenAlexW2006238834MaRDI QIDQ666293FDOQ666293

Naoki Kojima

Publication date: 8 March 2012

Published in: Annals of Finance (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10252/4050

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zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationimperfect competitioncredit contractlender borrower relationshiptype-dependent reservation utility

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Credit risk (91G40) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)

Cites Work

• Multiproduct Duopolists
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
• Participation constraints in adverse selection models
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games
• On countervailing incentives
• Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game

Cited In (5)

• Loan market equilibrium with difference of opinion and imperfect competition.
• On the effects of banks' equity ownership on credit markets
• Competitive Screening in Financial Markets when Borrowers can Recontract
• Competition in Lending: Theory and Experiments*
• Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information

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