Credit markets with moral hazard and heterogeneous valuations of collateral
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Publication:1273243
DOI10.1006/REEC.1998.0168zbMATH Open0912.90013OpenAlexW1999124862MaRDI QIDQ1273243FDOQ1273243
Authors: Clive Bell, Gerhard Clemenz 
Publication date: 6 December 1998
Published in: Research in Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/reec.1998.0168
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Cited In (12)
- Lender deception as a response to moral hazard
- Default and exogenous collateral in incomplete markets with a continuum of states
- The impact of systemic and illiquidity risk on financing with risky collateral
- Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in El Oulja
- Unproductive investment and rent extraction
- Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit Markets
- Creditworthiness and thresholds in a credit market model with multiple equilibria
- Credit Markets with Ethical Banks and Motivated Borrowers
- COLLATERALIZED CVA VALUATION WITH RATING TRIGGERS AND CREDIT MIGRATIONS
- Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets
- Collateralized Borrowing and Default Risk
- Incentives and the de Soto effect
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