Credit markets with moral hazard and heterogeneous valuations of collateral

DOI10.1006/REEC.1998.0168MaRDI QIDQ1273243zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Clive Bell, Gerhard Clemenz

Publication date 6 December 1998

Published in Research in Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/reec.1998.0168

zbMATH Keywords

collateralmoral hazardentry gamedebt contractsrural credit markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cited in

(12)

• Collateralized Borrowing and Default Risk
• Incentives and the de Soto effect
• Lender deception as a response to moral hazard
• Default and exogenous collateral in incomplete markets with a continuum of states
• The impact of systemic and illiquidity risk on financing with risky collateral
• Moral Hazard, Financial Constraints and Sharecropping in El Oulja
• Unproductive investment and rent extraction
• Moral Hazard Contracting and Private Credit Markets
• Creditworthiness and thresholds in a credit market model with multiple equilibria
• Credit Markets with Ethical Banks and Motivated Borrowers
• COLLATERALIZED CVA VALUATION WITH RATING TRIGGERS AND CREDIT MIGRATIONS
• Imperfect competition in differentiated credit contract markets

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