Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies

DOI10.2307/2298076MaRDI QIDQ4883968zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Mathias Dewatripont, Eric Maskin

Publication date 13 October 1996

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/0919c81ef4f732271e8c907c6827a47b64083c12

zbMATH Keywords

credit model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52)

Recommendations

• Indeterminacy in credit economies
• Limited commitment, money, and credit
• Lenders' reputation and the soft budget constraint
• A Model of Pairwise Credit
• CREDIT AND GROWTH UNDER LIMITED COMMITMENT

Cited in

(15)

• Why do multinational enterprises borrow from local banks?
• Monitoring and incentives under multiple-bank lending: the role of collusive threats
• Rotating Savings and Credit Associations, Credit Markets and Efficiency
• A signaling approach to soft budgets
• Insider control and the soft budget constraint: A simple theory
• Monitoring a common agent: Implications for financial contracting
• Development banking under weak institutions and imperfect credit markets
• Lenders' reputation and the soft budget constraint
• A dynamic model of soft budget-constraint
• Venture capital syndication and the financing of innovation: financial versus expertise motives
• SOE preference and credit misallocation: a model and some evidence from China
• Aid effectiveness and the soft budget constraint: EU development aid to the former Soviet Union
• Managerial overload and organization design
• ON THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF CREDIT ARRANGEMENTS
• COORDINATION, CREDIT, AND AN ELASTIC CURRENCY

This page was built for publication: Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4883968)