Aid effectiveness and the soft budget constraint: EU development aid to the former Soviet Union

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2011.05.021MaRDI QIDQ1942935zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Theocharis N. Grigoriadis

Publication date 14 March 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2011.05.021

zbMATH Keywords

aid effectivenessdevelopmental entrepreneursdistributive plannerssoft budget constrainttransnational sovereignty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economic models of real-world systems (e.g., electricity markets, etc.) (91B74) Mathematical economics (91B99)

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Cites work

• Credit and Efficiency in Centralized and Decentralized Economies
• Incentives, Information, and Organizational Form
• Innovation and Bureaucracy Under Soft and Hard Budget Constraints

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