IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT, AND FOREIGN AID

DOI10.1017/S1365100501010070MaRDI QIDQ4804670zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Elizabeth Asiedu, Anne P. Villamil

Publication date 28 April 2003

Published in Macroeconomic Dynamics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

EnforcementForeign AidForeign InvestmentMultilateral Organizations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Macroeconomic theory (monetary models, models of taxation) (91B64)

Recommendations

• International Lending with Moral Hazard and Risk of Repudiation
• Expropriation and foreign direct investment in a positive economic theory of foreign aid
• Do lack of transparency and enforcement undermine international risk-sharing?
• Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts
• Legal enforcement, default and heterogeneity of project-financing contracts

Cited in

(4)

• Expropriation and foreign direct investment in a positive economic theory of foreign aid
• Do lack of transparency and enforcement undermine international risk-sharing?
• Aid effectiveness and the soft budget constraint: EU development aid to the former Soviet Union
• Quality of governance and corporate real investment: Assessing the impact of foreign aid

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