Credit market imperfections and the separation of ownership from control

DOI10.1006/JETH.1997.2368MaRDI QIDQ1382005zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Daron Acemoglu

Publication date 1 April 1998

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1997.2368

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionmoral hazardcredit marketslow powered incentives

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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Cites work

• A model of insurance markets with incomplete information
• Equilibria in monopolistically competitive insurance markets
• Informational Equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values
• Wealth effects, distribution, and the theory of organization

Cited in

(2)

• Costly information, entry, and credit access
• Credit Markets with Ethical Banks and Motivated Borrowers

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