On the design of piece-rate contracts

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.02.011zbMATH Open1230.91093OpenAlexW2040621946MaRDI QIDQ985204FDOQ985204

Authors: Arup Bose, Debashis Pal, David E. M. Sappington 

Publication date: 20 July 2010

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.02.011

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zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardpiece-rate contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cites Work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Incentives and Transactions Costs Within the Firm: Estimating an Agency Model Using Payroll Records
• On the design of piece-rate contracts

Cited In (5)

• On the design of piece-rate contracts
• Contract design and bargaining power
• Characterizations of GIG laws: a survey
• Design, analysis and simulation of an optimal wage contract in firms
• Wage floors, imperfect performance measures, and optimal job design

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