On the design of piece-rate contracts

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2010.02.011MaRDI QIDQ985204zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Arup Bose, Debashis Pal, David E. M. Sappington

Publication date 20 July 2010

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2010.02.011

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardpiece-rate contracts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
• Moral hazard with bounded payments
• Dynamic contracts with moral hazard and adverse selection
• Optimal contracts with a risk-taking agent
• Design, analysis and simulation of an optimal wage contract in firms

Cites work

• Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives
• Incentives and Transactions Costs Within the Firm: Estimating an Agency Model Using Payroll Records
• On the design of piece-rate contracts

Cited in

(5)

• On the design of piece-rate contracts
• Contract design and bargaining power
• Characterizations of GIG laws: a survey
• Design, analysis and simulation of an optimal wage contract in firms
• Wage floors, imperfect performance measures, and optimal job design

This page was built for publication: On the design of piece-rate contracts

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q985204)