Incentives and Transactions Costs Within the Firm: Estimating an Agency Model Using Payroll Records

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00089MaRDI QIDQ4262875zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Christopher Ferrall, Bruce Shearer

Publication date 4 June 2000

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

incentivesincomplete informationinsurancepayroll records

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• The agency costs of on-the-job search
• The provision of wage incentives: a structural estimation using contracts variation
• Why an Informed Principal May Leave Rents to an Agent
• The Welfare Effects of Incentive Schemes
• Payoff implications of incentive contracting

Cited in

(3)

• On the design of piece-rate contracts
• The provision of wage incentives: a structural estimation using contracts variation
• Likelihood Estimation for Censored Random Vectors

This page was built for publication: Incentives and Transactions Costs Within the Firm: Estimating an Agency Model Using Payroll Records

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q4262875)