Agency conflicts in the presence of random private benefits from project implementation

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2014.02.025MaRDI QIDQ397941zbMATHOpenAlexFDO

Authors Ronald A. Dye, Sri S. Sridharan

Publication date 12 August 2014

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2014.02.025

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazarddepressed incentivesincreasing residual valuesoptimal contractingrandom private benefits

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Recommendations

• Optimal contracts with random monitoring
• Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts
• Principal and expert agent
• Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
• Optimal contracting with moral hazard and behavioral preferences

Cites work

• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information

Cited in

(3)

• Agency Conflicts and Risk Management*
• The irreversibility effect and agency conflicts
• The simple economics of white elephants

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