Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems

DOI10.1007/BF01238967MaRDI QIDQ1328149zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Arthur K. Selender, Liang Zou

Publication date 4 July 1994

Published in Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardagency problemsincentive structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Recommendations

• Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
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Cites work

• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• Optimal Contracts for Teams
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach
• Threat-based incentive mechanisms under moral hazard and adverse selection

Cited in

(2)

• Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
• Incentive roles and fringe benefits in compensation contracts

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