Limited liability and the underlying-asset constraint: On the use of share-derivative contracts to resolve agency problems

DOI10.1007/BF01238967zbMATH Open0802.90029MaRDI QIDQ1328149FDOQ1328149

Authors: Arthur K. Selender, Liang Zou 

Publication date: 4 July 1994

Published in: Journal of Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

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zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardagency problemsincentive structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Optimal Contracts for Teams
• Threat-based incentive mechanisms under moral hazard and adverse selection
• Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach

Cited In (2)

• Limited liability and non-responsiveness in agency models
• Incentive roles and fringe benefits in compensation contracts

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