Incentive and quality assurance: an agency theoretical perspective

DOI10.1080/00207729308949556MaRDI QIDQ5289316zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yeong Ling Yang

Publication date 23 August 1993

Published in International Journal of Systems Science. Principles and Applications of Systems and Integration (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/00207729308949556

zbMATH Keywords

just-in-timequalityquantity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Production models (90B30) Application models in control theory (93C95)

Recommendations

• Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Career concerns and performance reporting in optimal incentive contracts
• Implicit contracts with effort incentives

Cites work

• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Risk Aversion and the Choice Between Risky Prospects: The Preservation of Comparative Statics Results
• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems

Cited in

(3)

• Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted
• Testing the theory of multitasking: evidence from a natural field experiment in Chinese factories
• Quota bonuses with heterogeneous agents

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