Incentive and quality assurance: an agency theoretical perspective

DOI10.1080/00207729308949556zbMATH Open0774.90011OpenAlexW2000274360WikidataQ126249321 ScholiaQ126249321MaRDI QIDQ5289316FDOQ5289316

Authors: Yeong Ling Yang 

Publication date: 23 August 1993

Published in: International Journal of Systems Science. Principles and Applications of Systems and Integration (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207729308949556

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zbMATH Keywords

just-in-timequalityquantity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Production models (90B30) Application models in control theory (93C95)

Cites Work

• The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
• Risk Aversion and the Choice Between Risky Prospects: The Preservation of Comparative Statics Results

Cited In (3)

• Quota bonuses with heterogeneous agents
• Testing the theory of multitasking: evidence from a natural field experiment in Chinese factories
• Incentive contracts when production is subcontracted

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