Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model

DOI10.2307/2951698MaRDI QIDQ4833989zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Son Ku Kim

Publication date 23 May 1995

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp608.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mean preserving spreadagency modelBlackwell's sufficiency conditionlikelihood ratio distributions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Economics of information (91B44)

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(28)

• The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: the ex post contracting case
• Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology
• Endogenous criteria for success
• Information orders in screening problems
• A dual approach to agency problems
• Ranking of signals in multitask agency models
• Risk-bearing and entrepreneurship
• The effect of better information on income inequality
• Linear contracts and the double moral-hazard
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2159102 (Why is no real title available?)
• Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
• Ranking of information systems in agency models: an integral condition
• Information in tournaments under limited liability
• Communicating subjective evaluations
• All-or-nothing payments
• Information, risk sharing, and incentives in agency problems
• Comparing information in general monotone decision problems
• Information and the dispersion of posterior expectations
• Optimal screening with securities
• Voluntary ambiguity in incentive contracts
• Limited liability and the risk-incentive relationship
• Information design in the principal-agent problem
• Timing of information in agency problems with hidden actions
• Limited liability, the first-order approach, and the ranking of information systems in agencies
• On the relationship between the efficiency measures of multicategory information systems
• The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
• Contracting and search with heterogeneous principals and agents
• Relative income concerns, dismissal, and the use of pay-for-performance

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