Critical types

DOI10.1093/RESTUD/RDQ035MaRDI QIDQ5198890zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Jeffrey C. Ely, Marcin Pęski

Publication date 9 August 2011

Published in Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdq035

zbMATH Keywords

higher-order beliefsrobustness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Individual preferences (91B08)

Recommendations

• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Finite-order type spaces and applications
• Characterizing the Strategic Impact of Misspecified Beliefs
• Conditional belief types
• Beliefs and rationalizability in games with complementarities

Cited in

(13)

• On the generic robustness of solution concepts to incomplete information
• Robust refinement of rationalizability with arbitrary payoff uncertainty
• The e-mail game phenomenon
• Universal type structures with unawareness
• Uniform topologies on types
• Essential core of the Hawking–Ellis types
• The robust selection of rationalizability
• A structure theorem for rationalizability in the normal form of dynamic games
• Conditional belief types
• Inferring beliefs from actions
• The genericity of beliefs-determine-preferences models revisited
• Value‐based distance between information structures
• Continuous implementation with local payoff uncertainty

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