Common assumption of rationality

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102892zbMath1530.91081OpenAlexW3140798861MaRDI QIDQ6146428

H. Jerome Keisler, Byung-Soo Lee

Publication date: 5 February 2024

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102892

zbMATH Keywords

admissibilityepistemic game theoryassumptioniterated weak dominancebest-rationalization principle

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Admissibility and assumption
• Lexicographic beliefs and assumption
• Admissibility and event-rationality
• When do type structures contain all hierarchies of beliefs?
• Weak assumption and iterative admissibility
• Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
• Dominated strategies and common knowledge
• Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• Strategic rationality orderings and the best rationalization principle
• On a new axiomatic theory of probability
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Equilibrium Refinements
• Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty
• Admissibility in Games

This page was built for publication: Common assumption of rationality