Factors in learning dynamics influencing relative strengths of strategies in poker simulation

DOI10.3390/G14060073MaRDI QIDQ6555664zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Aaron Foote, Maryam Gooyabadi, Nikhil Addleman

Publication date 14 June 2024

Published in Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3390/G14060073

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionary game theorypokerreinforcement learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Cites work

• `Learning' with no feedback in a competitive guessing game.
• Collective behavior and evolutionary games -- an introduction
• Equilibrium points in n -person games
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2084390 (Why is no real title available?)
• Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term
• Modeling poker challenges by evolutionary game theory
• On the convergence of reinforcement learning
• Payoff assessments without probabilities: a simple dynamic model of choice
• Poker as a skill game: rational versus irrational behaviors
• Predicting how people play games: A simple dynamic model of choice
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Studies in machine cognition using the game of poker
• The role of forgetting in the evolution and learning of language

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