Modeling poker challenges by evolutionary game theory

DOI10.3390/g7040039zbMath1407.91047OpenAlexW2559748395MaRDI QIDQ725066

Marco Alberto Javarone

Publication date: 1 August 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040039

zbMATH Keywords

pokerpopulation dynamicsevolutionary game theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Related Items (1)

A SIMULATION STUDY OF TEXAS HOLD ’EM POKER: WHAT TAYLOR SWIFT UNDERSTANDS AND JAMES BOND DOESN’T

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