Modeling poker challenges by evolutionary game theory
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Publication:725066
DOI10.3390/G7040039zbMATH Open1407.91047OpenAlexW2559748395MaRDI QIDQ725066FDOQ725066
Authors: Marco Alberto Javarone 
Publication date: 1 August 2018
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g7040039
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Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Evolutionary game theory: theoretical concepts and applications to microbial communities
- Collective behavior and evolutionary games -- an introduction
- Effectiveness of conditional punishment for the evolution of public cooperation
- SOCIAL DILEMMAS AND COOPERATION IN COMPLEX NETWORKS
- Diversity of reproduction rate supports cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game on complex networks
- The mean field Ising model trough interpolating techniques
- Poker as a skill game: rational versus irrational behaviors
- Cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game in random scale-free graphs
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Competition of tolerant strategies in the spatial public goods game
Cited In (5)
- Factors in learning dynamics influencing relative strengths of strategies in poker simulation
- Poker cash game: a thermodynamic description
- Poker as a skill game: rational versus irrational behaviors
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A simulation study of Texas hold 'em poker: what Taylor Swift understands and James bond doesn't
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